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Blockchain technologies are commonly associated with cryptocurrencies, new               
markets around emergent currencies, and overall with the disruption of Finance.                     
However, the untapered potential of blockchain lies in its capacity to enable the                         
implementation of novel properties at an infrastructural level in a fully                     
decentralized manner, impacting the governance of technological tools. We are                   
currently witnessing the early stages of these emergent decentralized structures,                   
and thus their future potential beyond the financial world is just starting to be                           
explored. In the last years, there has been an emergent body of both projects                           
and literature around the role of new forms of blockchain-based governance. 
 
Two confronting standpoints dominate the emergent debate on blockchain and                   
governance, which we may refer to as techno-solutionist and market-driven                   
approaches, vs approaches supporting existing centralized institutions.  
 
The first group often aims to solve social problems through the creation of new                           
markets driven by their proposed cryptocurrencies. They show perspectives                 
characterised by a high degree of techno-determinism. These perspectives                 
envisage the emergence of new forms of blockchain-based governance on the                     
basis of the potential of these technologies for decentralisation and                   
trustlessness. These discourses typically inherently embed the idea of “market”                   
and tend to ignore the complexity of social organization. For example, they                       
commonly assume that hierarchies between the participants in decision-making                 
processes vanish thanks to the disintermediation enabled by blockchain                 
technologies (e.g. Swan 2015; Hayes 2016; Heuermann 2015). Overall, they tend                     
to provide reductionist accounts with regards to the distribution of power, failing                       
to acknowledge issues such as the generation of oligarchies or power dynamics                       
(Freeman 1972; Shaw & Hill 2014; De Filippi & Loveluck 2016). There are                         
abundant examples of techno-solutionist projects aiming to tackle social                 
problems through new markets, such as Steemit commodifying social media                   
interactions, the KodakCoin cryptocurrency to license Kodak photographs, or                 
Mercury Protocol rewards to tackle online harassment.  
 
The second, smaller group, opposes the first aiming to use blockchain                     
technologies to strengthen centralized traditional institutions. Their critical stand                 
against these techno-determinist perspectives has successfully identified and               
criticised the limitations of such approaches (e.g. Atzori 2015; Atzori & Ulieru                       
2017). Nevertheless, this critique is built upon the reinforcement of the role of                         
central authorities, resembling traditional responses against unregulated             
markets. In other words, these views consider traditional central authorities as                     
inherently necessary to enable democratic governance and, as a result, ignore                     
the potential for communities to successfully self-organise. By drawing on this                     
assumption, the potentialities of blockchain are envisioned in               
non-transformative ways: to support the control required by traditional                 
centralised forms of governance. For example, providing more transparency to                   
their central institutions (Nguyen 2016), more efficient mechanisms to avoid tax                     
fraud (Ainsworth & Shact 2016), or several banking consortiums such as R3.  
 
Still, beyond this reductionist dichotomy, there is a third approach worth                     
exploring: the one followed by Nobel laureate Elinor Ostrom , on the governance                       1
of commons. Ostrom’s work demonstrated that communities managing               
common pool resources were more efficient than both Market and State                     
managers, as long as they followed certain governance principles. Thus, this                     
third approach relies on previous studies on the self-governance of common                     
goods, enabling a perspective that does not rely on the logic of private markets,                           
as implicitly assumed by the hegemonic blockchain perspectives, neither on the                     
logic of centralised institutions, which the emergence of the blockchain originally                     
reacted against. The current debate is evolving to welcome this third approach,                       
as we can see in both recent research (Rozas et al 2018, Calcaterra 2018,                           
Shackelford & Myers 2017, Howell et al 2019), journalistic articles (Wong 2019,                       
Anderson 2019) and emerging blockchain projects embracing it, of which the                     
most relevant is the Commons Stack project (Emmet 2019), with the support of                         
Giveth (Decoodt 2019).  
 
This line of work explores essential questions such as: which are the                       
transformative potentials of blockchain technologies for more participatory               
forms of governance? Can we define relevant uses of blockchain beyond                     
techno-deterministic, market-driven scenarios and traditional centralised           
control? And overall, how can blockchain technologies facilitate large scale                   
cooperation?  
 
These questions regarding blockchain-enabled governance directly relate to one                 
of the blockchain promises: the emergence of Decentralized Autonomous                 
1 American Political Economist, she was awarded the Nobel Prize in Economics in 2009 for her                               
"analysis of economic governance, especially the commons", becoming the first woman to win                         
the prize.  
Organizations, or DAOs. A DAO is an organization where the interaction of                       2
members (humans or machines) is mediated by a blockchain application,                   
controlled only and exclusively by a ​set of immutable and incorruptible rules                       
embedded in its source code. A DAO can be regarded as a digital organization                           
mediated by a software agent , whose code is in the blockchain. As a                         3
decentralized organization, a DAO ​can ​provide ​services (or resources) to                   
third-parties, or even ​hire people to perform specific tasks. Hence, individuals                     
can transact with a DAO in order to benefit from the service it provides, or to get                                 
paid for a contribution they made. As opposed to traditional online platforms,                       
DAOs do not rely on any central server and cannot be arbitrarily shut down by                             
any single party (unless specifically provided for in their code). Thus, DAOs may                         
be considered fully ​autonomous, to the extent that they do not need their                         
original creator. Besides, a DAO may be considered ​self-sufficient​, to the extent                       
that they can charge users for their own services (or assets) in order to pay for                               
the services they need. A theoretical example could be a DAO-Couchsurfing                     
(Couchsurfing is a hospitality network where members stay in each other's                     
house couches), which provides a public directory of places, and users can                       
interact and even reward the hosts with reputational tokens.  
 
A lot has been written on how the Web 2.0 has facilitated new forms of social                               4
organization and cooperation. At the same time, it has raised unparalleled                     
control to a few large multinational corporations which act as owners of the                         
enabling infrastructure. This has caused multiple issues around surveillance,                 
privacy, accountability, exploitation, exclusion and monopolistic practices             
(Benkler, 2016, Greenwald 2014, Anderson & Wolff 2010). DAOs provide a new                       
way for building online software platforms, in which the technical infrastructure                     
is shared, enabling higher levels of democratization, transparency and                 
accountability. Thus, the promise of a Web 3.0 enabled by blockchain                     5
governance could potentially enable the benefits of boosting cooperation from                   
Web 2.0 without several of its main core caveats.  
 
Such promise has attracted multiple activists, nonprofits and “well-intentioned”                 
actors to the field, and in particular to the creation of DAO-like organizations                         
2 Considering “organization” as an entity comprising multiple people (or distributed applications) 
with a specific goal, not a legally registered organization.  
3A software agent is a computer program with some degree of autonomy and agency, typically 
working continuously in a dynamic environment. 
4 “Web 2.0” or “Social Web” refers to the kind of websites that emerged since the 2000s, which                                   
emphasize user-generated content, usability, participatory culture and interoperability. We may                   
think of Youtube or Facebook.  
5 The Web 3.0 is an emerging paradigm for websites relying on more decentralized technologies                             
such as blockchain, together with disintermediation, automation, openness and profit sharing. In                       
this context, it does not refer to the Semantic Web, which was sometimes referred to as Web 3.0                                   
in the past.  
supported by DLT technologies. It is true that, if such potentials were untapped,                         
we can envision ecosystems of small organizations connected through                 
automated systems, with DAOs automating some of the burdens of large-scale                     
organization and facilitating the emergence of new International Organizations,                 
Federations and Confederations. In such scenario, it would be possible, for                     
instance: to have public institutions using freedom-respecting software               
providing services without compromising user’s privacy (e.g. through the                 
mathematical method of zero-knowledge proofs ); to have large-scale               6
cooperation across non-profits validated by a network of trust in which each                       
vouches for their known “friends”; to have new crowdsourced metrics of the                       
multiple forms of value created by communities and social actors; to customize                       
services beyond the current uniformity imposed by monopolistic software                 
platforms, lowering the barriers for competition and opening the door to new                       
forms of innovation by multiple nonprofit and for-profit actors; appropriate                   
automatic rewarding of work, including previously invisible reproductive work.                 
And all these forms of cooperation would be facilitated without having an owner                         
of the infrastructure with absolute control over the network and its resources.  
 
However, such beautiful utopic scenarios, brought by both techno-deterministic                 
and commoners in different degrees, confront a reality in which decentralized                     
infrastructure, especially for DAOs, are not yet ready for large-scale deployment.                     
Ethereum, with its DAO concepts, was first proposed in 2013, and had its initial                           
release in 2015. Since then, three large blockchain projects have promised to                       
make DAOs a reality: Aragon, DAO Stack and Colony. They are undoubtedly                       
moving forward, and e.g. Aragon has 1,300 prototype DAOs. Still, these projects                       
development is slower than initially projected, and have suffered from multiple                     
issues. In fact, the technical and social challenges have been greater than                       
anticipated, including: scalability of Ethereum, that these projects rely upon;                   
standardization and interoperability across blockchains and with existing               
systems; usability for non-geeks; large-scale fair governance issues which have                   
challenged political scientists for centuries and free/open source communities                 
for decades; legal issues such as GDPR-compliance; a profound lack of trained                       
blockchain developer supply; environmental concerns with Proof of Work                 7
algorithms… These challenges have slowed down development and               
expectations, and eventually caused that, 12 years after Bitcoin and 7 years after                         
Ethereum, we still do not have widely successful DAO cases to look into. 
 
6 In Cryptography, a zero knowledge proof is a privacy-preserving method used to verify things                             
without sharing or revealing underlying data, e.g. verifying a person has a valid driving license                             
without accessing any of the license data.  
7 Proof of Work is a consensus mechanism, and an inherent part of the first blockchains like                                 
Bitcoin, which requires very high amounts of computation and thus of energy to be maintained. 
Still, we cannot despise the whole field, since there is a wide diversity of                           
worthwhile projects that can be considered “Blockchain/DLT for social good”, i.e.                     8
aiming for social impact. Our research group, in a collaboration with the                       
European Commission’s Joint Research Center, recently mapped the European                 
ecosystem of such projects, and some of its figures may throw some light on the                             
current state of the “DLT for Good” field.  
 
The study (Hassan et al, 2020) accounted for 130 projects with functional                       
software, within Europe. It shows that the top 5 European countries in number                         
of initiatives are, in this order, UK (16%), Switzerland (14%), Spain (12%),                       
Netherlands (12%) and Germany (10%). The majority of the projects (59%) rely                       
on a for-profit company (often claiming to be social enterprises), and yet there is                           
a high number of not-for-profit organizations (30%). This contradicts the overall                     
image of innovative entrepreneurship being driven just by for-profits. We do                     
observe a bias per country, e.g. with the UK having 87% of its projects                           
catalogued as driven by for-profit enterprises, while EU countries having more                     
similar percentage among nonprofits/for-profits.  
 
As it is to be expected, these projects have emerged in the last 8 years, with a                                 
peak in 2017 (44%) -- correlated with the blockchain hype. They mostly (80%) rely                           
on public blockchains (mostly Ethereum, 66%) rather than private DLTs (like                     
Hyperledger). Thus, they are affected by the current technical problems of                     
Ethereum with refer to e.g. scalability. Thus, it is naturally expected that                       
technical advances in the infrastructure layer (commonly referred as “L1”) will                     
facilitate the work of this kind of projects.  
 
It is worth noting 73% of the projects have their code in a Github repository,                             
most of them with a free/open source license. In rates similar to the IT sector in                               
general, women account for almost 30% of the workforce, although most of                       
them in non-technical positions, and very few in co-founder roles.  
Overall, these figures enable us to see points of intervention for Europe to                         
facilitate the work of the emergent DLT for Good field that it’s brewing within its                             
grounds. It would be sensible to reinforce existing trends, as in: promoting                       
free/open source projects and digital open commons in general; funding                   
research to solve the infrastructural problems; supporting both for- and                   
non-profit entrepreneurship (and not just the former); incentivizing diversity in                   
technical teams; and aiding the consolidation of the emerging hubs already                     
appearing in several European countries.  
 
8 DLT stands for Distributed Ledger Technology, which refers to systems in which data is shared                               
and synchronized across multiple actors without a central mediator. Blockchains are a example                         
of DLT. 
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 Annex: 3 Key Policy Recommendations 
1) Investing in the research and construction of free/open source                   
decentralized technical infrastructure 
The current Collaborative Economy is overwhelmed with monopolistic corporate                 
US-based platforms causing a large number of issues (e.g. Facebook, Uber,                     
Google, Airbnb). Europe is currently putting efforts in trying to have their own                         
“European Unicorn” . However, barriers for competition are very high in the                     9
current playing field, so it may be more sensible to change the rules of the game.                               
That is, support the emergence of decentralized interoperable open source                   
infrastructure where new ecosystems can thrive, providing customized services                 
which are unthinkable nowadays. There are multiple technical and social                   
challenges with respect to developing decentralized tech, and today there is a                       
window of opportunity for Europe to boost the field and strengthen their                       
position. It is already happening, with e.g. “Bloxberg” providing blockchain                   
research infrastructure after an initiative from the Max Planck Library.  
2) Strengthen EU hubs on decentralized tech, including               
not-just-for-profit, open and diverse projects 
The mapping of the European ecosystem of DLT for Good has provided insights                         
on the existing trends and projects already ongoing. Public institutions now have                       
the chance to strengthen this ecosystem, aiding in the consolidation of the                       
emerging hubs already appearing in several European countries. This should be                     
done not just focused on for-profit entrepreneurship, but also on non-profit                     
entrepreneurship, as the data shows has a strong presence in the EU. In fact,                           
this has happened in the free/open source software world for decades in the                         
USA (e.g. Mozilla Foundation, Apache Foundation, Free Software Foundation). In                   
the same line, strengthening the existing trends on openness and diversity will                       
give a clear advantage to teams aligned with European values in the                       
international arena. 
3) Promoting Platform Co-ops as emerging governance & business                 
models  
The Collaborative Economy facilitated by the centralized Internet has enabled                   
large US-centric monopolies which act as central data hubs for the world                       
population private data. However, as the Sharing Cities Declaration states, when                     
considering policy, not all platforms are the same               
9 In Finance, a “unicorn” is a privately held startup company valued at over $1 billion. It is                                   
specially used in the Collaborative Economy field to refer to examples such as Airbnb or Uber.  
(​https://www.sharingcitiesaction.net/declaration/ ). With the emerging         
decentralized web, new possibilities open up concerning governance and                 
business models. As opposed to the US, in Europe people are more used to                           
participatory businesses and co-ops, and a 17% of Europe’s population are                     
members of a cooperative business. Today, there is an opportunity to support                       
an emerging business and governance model, in line with decentralized tech:                     
Platform Co-ops, i.e. platforms in which the users have a voice and a share of the                               
profits, such as the German Fairmondo. There are already public initiatives to                       
support, incubate and accelerate such projects, such as Barcelona City Council’s                     
“La Comunificadora”.  
 
 
